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July, 1954
THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
CLINTON B. STEWART of the Colorado Bar*
The purpose of this paper is to explore the employer's right
to discharge employees as that right exists today. During the
past fifty years labor has risen to be a potent economic and social
force. The struggle of labor has resulted in encroachments by
the unions upon employer prerogatives. Management has felt the
impact of labor through legislation and collective agreements curb-
ing the rights of management as they were known under laissez
faire. This paper is chiefly concerned with the effect of the col-
lective union contract upon the employer's right to discharge. It
is hoped that it will point out the ways in which the union con-
tract has affected this right, how the contract deals with the sub-
ject, who may enforce the contract, and what seems to be some
of the modern trends. Legislative restraints upon the employer
are mentioned only in passing. Arbitration has been given inci-
dental treatment because the author feels that a detailed report
on arbitration would be too consuming for the purposes of this
paper.
Most union contracts recognize the employer's right to dis-
charge employees; at the same time the contracts attempt to limit
the right to "just cause". The importance of the contract is dem-
onstrated by a recent case, Jenkins v. Thompson, in which the
court said that a contract of employment is a prerequisite to a
cause of action for wrongful discharge.1 This is verified in an
early Colorado case in which the court said that the employees
of a railroad company have no cause of action based upon dis-
charge where they have no contract for a stipulated time.2 It is
interesting to note that in another Colorado case where the court
was considering a discharge for cause under an individual con-
tract, it was held that every contract for hire of services, whether
for a definite or indefinite time, is subject to the right of the em-
ployer to discharge the employee for sufficient cause.
3
Where the union contract does limit the employer's right
many questions have arisen. Some of these are: Is the employee
a third party beneficiary? Is the Union the agent of the employee?
Is the contract enforceable by the employee though his term of
employment is indefinite? Must the employee be a member of the
union that negotiated the contract?
It should be remembered that the most substantial gains of
labor did not come until after 1932. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
in Section 2 declared the public policy of the Federal Government
which recognized the employees' right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing without coercion on
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law
251 S. W. (2d) 325 (Mo., 1953).
Frank v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 23 F. 123 (1885).
'Little v. Dougherty, 11 Colo. 103, 17 P. 292 (1887).
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the part of the employer. 4 The courts were slow to recognize the
rights of employees under collective agreements where the sub-
ject of dispute involved provisions included primarily for the
benefit of the individual employee. The law is by no means settled,
but by this time certain definite patterns are reflected by the cases.
Early history is not of great significance in considering this
subject, except that the reader should keep in mind the fact that
under laissez faire the employer enjoyed a minimum of restraint.
The first collective agreement that tended to limit the employer's
control over discharge and discipline was negotiated in 1890 by
the International Typographical Union. 5 The law on the subject
is still quite new, yet it may be said that the rights of individuals
under these contracts now seem to be generally recognized.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
There are two basic forces which restrict the right of the
employer to discharge employees. Legislation by the federal and
state governments reflects the intervention of government as a
third party in labor disputes restricting the rights of management.
The .collective contract reflects not only the effect of this legisla-
tion, but also the rise of labor to a bargaining plane with manage-
ment.
Present legislative and contract restraints running against
the employer represent compromises between both employees and
management.' The employee on the one hand is interested in job
security to prevent economic loss through loss of wages. He must
also face the stigma attached to a discharge and finally face the
possible prospect of securing new employment. The employer must
have a strong means by which to maintain discipline. Yet he must
consider the consequences of a discharge. A strike or strained labor-
management relation may result. He must preserve harmony to
continue efficient production and, of course, he must consider the
cost of training new employees.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act through its declaration of public
policy, as mentioned before, undoubtedly had considerable force
in paving the way for the modern collective contract. This then
offered an indirect restraint upon the employer. Next the Wagoner
Act limited the employer's right to discharge for union activitits.
7
Discharge of an employee for union activities is an unfair labor
practice under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Under the Wagoner
Act the employer can be forced to reinstate an employee where
the employer has violated Section 8 (a). The railroad workers
have found similar protection in the Railway Labor Act of 1926.
These acts have provided the main limitations upon the employer's
prerogative of discharge; however, minor limitations appear in
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. 102 (1940).
John A. Lapp, How to Handle Labor Grievances, National Foremen's Insti.
tute, Inc., p. 44 (1946).
6 C. C. H., Labor Relations, Vol. 5, Union Contracts, Sec. 51,501 (1953).
7 National Labor Relations Act, 51 Stat. 5 (1937), 29 U. S. C. 158.
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other federal statutes. For example, the Selective Service Act
prevents discrimination against a veteran upon return to his em-
ployment after discharge from the armed services.8 This is by
no means a complete review of the federal law as it pertains tc
this subject, but to add more would go beyond the scope of this
paper. State legislation has been specifically excluded.
The union contract, limiting the right of the employer to dis-
charge, progressed rapidly after federal legislation recognized
individual rights of employees. Most contracts affirm the right of
the employer to discharge; in fact, the contract may state that
"The full power of discharge and discipline lies with the em-
ployer".9 But the contract does not end here. This power of dis-
charge is limited to discharge for "just cause" or "for good cause"
or "good and sufficient cause". 10 In the early days of collective
contract, the term "just cause" must have been a fruitful area of
litigation. Most of the contracts with the larger industries still
recognize the employer's prerogative but provide for arbitration
as a means of disposing of disputes over discharge. Arbitration
awards will be treated more extensively later in this paper. As a
matter of illustration, it has been held that the discharge was for
just cause where the employee was inefficient, where he had beer
careless in the use of equipment, where he violated company rules,
where he had been drinking on the job or was drunk on the job,
or where company equipment had been sabotaged by the employee.
The employer has the right to lay off employees under an economy
move, however, he should use care that the layoff does not indicate
discrimination for union activities.1 1
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The real force in the union contract restricting the employer's
right to discharge rests in the power to enforce this provision.
Historically, it might be safely stated that prior to the Norris-
LaGuardian Act (1932), the general rule was that the employee
had no right of action against the employer for a wrongful dis-
charge in violation of the contract.12 This rule has been supported
on various grounds. Some of these were: that the employee did
not ratify or adopt the contract, and the union was not his agent;
that the employee's individual contract with the employer was for
an indefinite period, and the contract remained unenforceable for
want of reciprocity; that the contract was between the union and
the employer and was not intended to operate between the em-
ployer and employee; that the employee was not a member of the
union at the time the contract was executed; or that the employee
was not within the class of employees intended to be benefited by
the contract. It should now be pointed out that there is a definite
1C. C. H., Labor, Vol. 5, Union Contracts, Sec. 51,502 (1953).
'John A. Lapp, How to Handle Labor Grievances, 45 (1946).
"Ibid, p. 45.
"Prentice-Hall Labor Course. Sec. 4296 (1953).
"31 Am. Jur. 880, Labor, Sec. 119.
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shift to the view that collective agreements are enforceable by
the employee on the theory that the employees are third party
beneficiaries, or that an agency relation existed between the union
members or employees and the bargaining agent.13
There seem to be about twelve states which recognize the col-
iective contracts a.s third part-, beneficiary contracts independent
of adoption or ratification by the employee.14 Adding to these the
states which will enforce the contracts if ratification or adoption
is shown, those requiring employment for a definite term, and,
those which follow the agency theory, the general rule could be
stated that the courts will permit the employee to sue on the col-
lective contract where the cause of action arises from provisions
made for his sole benefit as distinguished from the provisions in-
tended to be effective only between the employer and the union.'-
With this background, it is clear that the attorney will en-
counter one or more of the following questions:
1. Could the employee enforce the wrongful discharge
provision if it were contained in a contract between
himself and the employer?
2. Must the employee adopt or ratify the contract?
3. Is the wrongful discharge clause for his own benefit
or the benefit of the union?
4. Must the employee be a member of the union at the
time the contract was executed?
A review of some of the cases will demonstrate the various
views that the courts have taken on the question of wrongful dis-
charge. In the case of Swart v. Huston, the court refused to let
the employee recover for wrongful discharge because the em-
ployee had no contract for a definite term.1 6 He could terminate
without a liability running to the employer; and since there was
no reciprocal remedy in favor of the other party, the contract
would not be enforceable for want of mutuality. The court said
that the collective agreement standing alone would give the em-
ployee no rights, but hinted that had the contract been adopted
or ratified in the individual contract of employment, then it might
be enforceable though the court did not indicate the theory of
action that should be used. 17
In the case of Kessell v. Great Northern R. Co., the court
refused to permit an employee to sue on a collective contract where
the cause of action was based upon the methods and rules of dis-
charge, upon the theory that the contract was intended to operate
between the employer and the union.' s There was no individual
' Ibid, 1954 supplement, p. 97, Sec. 119.
"18 A. L. R. (2d) 367.
1518 A. L. R. (2d) 367.
11 154 Kans. 182, 117 P. (2d) 576 (1941).
"But see Johnson v. Am. R. Express Co., 161 S. E. 473 (1932), infra p. 11,
where the court construed a union contract to create a definite term by implica-
tion based upon the limitation running against the employer.
Is51 F. (2d) 3'04 (W. D., N. D. 1931).
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contract with the employee. In a Canadian case, Young v. Canadian
N. R. Co., the court refused to allow the employee an action upon
the ground that there was no privity between the employer and
the employee. 19 In this case the employee was a member of a rival
union at the time the contract was executed.
Some of the cases attempt to distinguish between the em-
ployer's right to discharge independent of the contract and the
right as controlled by the contract. This was pointed out in the
case of Dierchaw v. West Suburban Dairies, in which the court
placed the burden on the employee to show that he went to work
pursuant to the agreement before he could claim the benefit of the
contract.2 0 In this case the employee was not covered by the con-
tract; therefore, the employer merely exercised his unqualified
right to discharge.
From these cases it should be noted that some courts will
not enforce the contract because it is only between the employer
and the union; others require that there be a definite term of
employment; others require adoption or ratification; and still
others would limit the right to members of the union negotiating
the contract. In none of the foregoing cases was the employee
allowed a cause of action based upon a provision which would
appear to be in the contract for the sole benefit of the individual
employees. Should they not have qualified as third party bene-
ficiaries under the contract?
Turning now to the more modern view which holds the col-
lective contract to be enforceable. One of the most interesting
opinions on the theory that the employee may enforce the contract
as a third party beneficiary appears in the case of Yazoo & M. V.
R. Co. v. Sideboard.21 This case seems to ;epresent the modern
trend. After the court reviewed the history of labor contracts, it
stated:
• . . these rulings have been left in the rear in the ad-
vancement of the law on this subject, and the holdings
now are that these agreements are primarily for the
individual benefit of the members of the organization,
and that the rights secured by these contracts are the
individual rights of the individual members of the union,
and may be enforced directly by the individual.
It should be pointed out here that the court enforced the contract
as a third party beneficiary contract, but that the wording above
quoted would seem to indicate that the court would limit the action
to members of the union. The opinion also limits the employee's
action to provisions that are for his own immediate benefit. It
would seem then that the test under these cases should be as here
quoted:
o 4 D. L. R. 542.
"276 Ill. App. 355 (1934).
- 161 Miss. 4, 133 S. 669 (1931.).
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Provisions in a collective labor agreement which
limit the employer's right of discharge have been gen-
erally held enforceable by an individual employee as in-
serted for his benefit, where such a provision would have
been valid and enforceable had it been part of an indi-
vidual employment contract.22
This test would recognize that the primary obligations of the con-
tract are between the union and the employer, but that the inci-
dental benefits to the employees would be protected by giving them
a cause of action. It would seem that the membership in the union
would not be a condition of enforcement.
The next inquiry should be directed to the extent of employees'
rights as third party beneficiaries. The most important factor
seems to be that the employee must first be within the particular
class of employees intended to be benefited. This is largely a
matter of interpreting the contract. In Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v.
Webb, the court had to first consider this question before it could
consider the merits.23 There the court pointed out that where the
contract was made for the benefit of a particular class, members
of that class could enforce the terms of the contract regardless of
union membership. Where the employee was not within the class,
he would have no action unless the provisions were specifically
extended to include him.
It has been generally held that a collective labor
agreement made between an employer and a labor union
for the benefit of all the employees, or a class of employees,
may be enforced by an individual employee within the
scope of the agreement, even though he is not a member
of the contracting union.
2 4
This would seem to be in harmony with the philosophy of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act which limits bargaining to a single rep-
resentative body.2 5 In considering this matter one court said, "A
bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations Act or under
the Railway Labor Act is but an agent for a principal". As an
agent, the union "is duty bound to represent fairly not only its
own membership, but all the employees in whose behalf it has
authority to bargain". 26 It should be remembered that the right
of discharge as considered in this portion of the paper is the right
as affected by the contract with the union independent of legisla-
tion creating other restraints, and, therefore, we are concerned
with the enforcement arising out of state-created rights and not
federally-created rights.
218 A. L. R. (2d) 361.
3C. C. A. Miss., 64 F. (2d) 902 (1933).
18 A. I R. (2d) 370.
2National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. S. 159(a)
(1940).
- Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers v. Tunstall, 163 F. (2d)
289 (1948).
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A minority of the states let the employee sue on the contract
upon the theory of agency. The union is the agent of the employees
under this theory. This becomes important from the standpoint
of determining who are principals. In at least one case, Shelley v.
Portland Tug & Barge Co., it was held that a non-union employee
would have no action for wrongful discharge under a collective
agreement.27 The court denied the action because there was no
showing the union had authority to act for non-union employees.
It is interesting to note the position taken by one court which
was concerned with the enforcement of a collective contract where
the question of definiteness in time was raised.28 In this case the
court held that the term of employment could in effect be construed
to be for a definite time because the contract bestowed a substan-
tive right upon the employee during the life of the contract and
restricted the right of the employer to discharge only for the life
of the contract.
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
The net effect of union contracts has been to restrict manage-
ment's rights to discharge for "just cause" only. The evolution
in this area has been to work out a satisfactory system for deter-
mining what is "just cause" without the necessity of resort to the
courts in each instance. The author has examined twelve union con-
tracts with various large employers and without arbitration excep-
tion has been provided for as an end result.29 Arbitration has dis-
tinct advantages to both the union and management at least where
individual grievances are concerned. It provides a much faster
method of handling disputes than resort to the courts. The em-
ployee can afford to pursue this remedy if he feels the employer vio-
lated the contract, and the employer in a relatively short time knows
the bounds of "just cause". The arbitration machinery utilized for
handling other union grievances may be made available to handle
discharge cases if the parties so provide in the contract. Where
this is provided for the contract will generally state that the arbi-
trator is to expedite discharge cases.
Most union contracts set out a system of handling disputes
by mediation first and provide for arbitration only as a last re-
sort. These contracts generally provide for notice to the employee
and a representative of the union with a specification of the reasons
for the discharge. The employee must then seek a hearing within
a specified period (two to five days). This first hearing is at the
shop or department level with the foreman and a union represen-
tative. If this fails, the employee or union may seek a hearing
before a company-wide representative official or officials and a
similar representative from the local union. If still no settlement
is reached, then a further appeal might be taken to a board con-
"158 Ore. 377, 76 P. (2d) 477 (1938).
Johnson v. American R. Express Co., 163 S. C. 191, 161 S. E. 473 (1931).
-' C. C. H. Labor Relations, Vol. 5, Union Contracts, Sec. 51,502 (1945).
July, 1954 DICTA
July, 1954
sisting of company officials and representatives from the parent
union. Then if these negotiations fail or either party is not satis-
fied, the matter may be submitted to an arbitrator as provided in
the contract. The decision of the arbirtator is specifically stated in
the contract to be final and binding on the parties.
Where the contract provides for arbitration, the employee
must pursue his cause as provided in the contract or he has no ac-
tion at law. In the case of Swilley v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.,
the court held that an employee could not sue at law on the ground
of wrongful discharge where he failed to exhaust the remedy
provided in the contract.30 But there is also an obligation on the
part of the employer to follow the terms of the contract in the
settlement of a discharge dispute. It was held in the case of Moore
County Carbon Co. v. Whitten that an employer could not raise the
defense that the employee had not complied with the provisions of
the contract where the employer had prevented the employee from
complying.
31
A discussion of arbitration would not be complete without
considering Rule 109 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the collective contract meets the requirements of this rule then
The party in whose favor any award shall be made, may
file the same with the clerk of the district court of the
county wherein the matters were arbitrated, who shall
enter a judgment thereon, and if such award requires the
payment of money, the clerk may issue execution there-
for.
3 2
If the agreement does not come within the proscription of this
rule, then the employee, where successful, would have to sue in
court on the contract to enforce the award. The contract would
meet the requirements of the rule if it was in writing and provided
for arbitration therein, if the parties are to be bound by the award,
and if it provides for the filing with the court and issuance of
execution as a means of enforcement of the award.
3
CONCLUSION
There now remains little doubt that a majority of the states
will recognize the rights of individual employees to enforce a con-
tract which limits the employer's right to discharge to "just cause"
only. It would seem that the cases would line up in the following
manner:
1. Where a state recognizes third party beneficiary contracts
and the court will construe the contract to be one, the em-
ployee may sue for wrongful discharge though his term of
employment is indefinite providing he is within the class of
'C. C. A. Texas, 96 S. W. (2d) 105 (1936).
11C. C. A. Texas, 140 S. W. (2d) 880 (1940).3 2
Colo. R. C. P. 109(e).
33 Ibid, 109(b).
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employees intended to be benefited by the contract. Union
membership would not be necessary.
2. Where the state recognizes third party beneficiary con-
tracts and the court will construe the contract to be one,
but requires the third party to acknowledge the contract,
then the employee must ratify or adopt the contract be-
fore he has a cause of action. Union membership would
be immaterial.
3. One test that would assist in determining if the provision
should be enforced as a third party beneficiary provision
is to determine whether the provision would be enforceable
between the employee and the employer if it were in an
individual contract. Most wrongful discharge cases meet
this test.
4. Where the state refuses to construe the contract as a
third party beneficiary contract, the employee may still
have his cause of action based upon the theory of agency,
but in these cases it would seem that the burden of show-
ing that the agency existed at the time the contract was
executed is upon the employee. This could preclude a
non-union employee or a member of a rival union from
an action based on the collective contract. Under this doc-
trine union membership must have existed at the time the
contract was executed. No cases have been found by the
author demonstrating the effect of the agency doctrine as
set out in the National Labor Relations Act where the
employee relied upon the act to establish the agency.
5. In jurisdictions that refuse the employee recovery be-
cause the contract was intended to operate only between
the union and the employer, there is no action that accrues
to the benefit of the employee; however, there are strong
indications in some cases that the employee could claim
the benefit of the contract if he adopted it as a part of his
individual contract. It is not clear whether he would sue
here as a third party beneficiary or on the theory that it
is his own contract.
6. Some jurisdictions might still refuse to extend the benefit
of the wrongful discharge clause to employees on the theory
that though the collective agreement may be for a definite
term the employee's individual contract is not for a definite
term, and if he is free to terminate at any time and for any
cause, there is no reciprocal provision running in favor
of the employer, thus making the contract ineffective for
want of reciprocity. As has been pointed out, this has
been overcome in at least one case reported by construing
the substantive right of the employee with the restriction
limiting the employer as creating a definite term. The
theory of the indefinite term does not seem to have the
general approval of the courts.
July, 1954 DICTA 253
July, 1954
If the employee does have a cause of action which was created
by the union contract, his rights are then limited according to the
terms of the contract. Where the contract provides for arbitra-
tion, he must follow the arbitration procedure or forfeit his cause
of action unless the employer's acts have prevented him from
complying with the contract. If the state has an arbitration statute
which gives summary effect to an arbitration award where the
contract meets the provisions of the statute, then he need not sue
to enforce the award; however, where he cannot qualify under the
statute, he must sue in the proper court to enforce the award.
Arbitration seems to meet with general approval, at least, where
the dispute concerns the rights of the individual employee for
discharge.
Modern legislation coupled with the restrictions of the col-
lective contract have greatly altered the position of the employer
from that of his predecessor under laissez faire. It may be that
the employer today is suffering for the delinquencies of the past;
however, taking all matters into consideration, he has not suffered
too badly in this one instance because he can still discharge for
"just cause". Except in limited circumstances, it would seem that
the burden should not be unbearable when weighed in the light of
public and individual gains.
SOCIETY FOR CRIPPLED CHILDREN
To better serve handicapped children and adults in Colo-
rado, and particularly in Metropolitan Denver, the Denver
County Society for Crippled Children is attempting to assume
full financial responsibility for the operation of Sewall House,
Denver's Therapy Center. The State Society is an adminis-
trative organization that assists outlying counties. Previously,
the State Society had contributed some $20,000.00 annually
toward the support of Sewall House.
Any bequests or gifts intended to benefit and/or provide
treatments for crippled children and adults at Sewall House
should be made out to the Denver County Society for Crippled
Children and Adults, Inc.
This organization, without assistance from Community
Chest or United Funds, has been serving the crippled of all
races and creeds, regardless of their ability to assist in any
payment, since 1939.
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